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The EU faces an existential crisis. The ‘liberal core’, which played an important role 
in transforming the illiberal regimes in much of the post-war period, suffers from a 
series of setbacks. This paper argues that the possibility of reverse transformation – 
that is, the power of the emergent illiberal bloc to influence the liberal core, has 
become a real possibility for the first time in the history of European integration. The 
paper contributes to the growing debate on the sources of the EU’s existential crisis 
and its future from a global political economy perspective. We suggest that a push-
and-pull framework provides a coherent analytical toolkit to explain the properties 
and nature of the illiberal turn in the EU with its potential implications for the future 
of European integration. 
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Ten years after the Eurozone crisis, the European Union (EU) is facing existential 
challenges. The rise of illiberalism throughout the continent and a variety of 
disintegrative factors is presenting unprecedented tests to the core values of the EU. 
Few could imagine this kind of reversal of fortunes especially in the early 2000s when 
deepening and enlargement were taking place at full speed – projecting enthusiasm 
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and confidence for the future of the European integration project. Today, we seem to 
have reached a point where liberal democracy relapses throughout the continent. The 
retreat is particularly pronounced in some of the key members in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) that have become the poster child of the EU’s successful 
transformative capacity. For instance, Hungary, a member state since 2004, is now 
described by leading scholars such as Way and Levitsky (2019) as an example of 
“competitive authoritarianism” in the heartland of Europe. The democratic retreat in 
Poland is another striking case of illiberal backlash. The candidate states such as 
Serbia and Turkey also experience a significant wave of autocratization (Table 1). 
How can we explain this dramatic turn of events that result in an increasing loss of 
self-confidence regarding the future of the EU, notably in conjunction with its overall 
leverage in a changing international order? 
 
Scholars of European integration have already started to theorize the challenges that 
the EU currently faces and offer explanations as to whether, why and how European 
disintegration unfolding (Webber 2014; Zielonka 2014; Jones 2018). One strand of 
scholarship, focusing on regional integration theories attempts to explain the 
historical, functional, and institutional forces behind regression of liberal European 
governance model (Jones, Kelemen and Meunier 2016; Schimmelfennig 2015; 
Vollaard 2014). Another strand, drawing from mid-range Europeanization accounts 
explores issue-specific domestic forces of non-compliance with EU conditionality as 
main factors that drive a new wave of “de-Europeanization” and illiberal turn (Alphan 
and Diez 2014; Ágh 2015; Öniş and Kutlay 2019).  
 
The present paper contributes to the debate on the future of the EU as well as Europe 
from a global political economy perspective that takes into account the interplay of 
domestic and international dynamics as part of a broader hegemonic contestation over 
European order. We agree that domestic politics and institutions matter. However, the 
premise of this paper is that one cannot explain the far-reaching and paradoxical 
changes that we currently observe by focusing on internal dynamics alone. Our 
central proposition is that powerful political economy shifts in international order are 
critical to reveal the shifting sands in European integration project. To substantiate 
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this argument, we sketch push-and-pull framework as a coherent analytical model.1  
The push-and-pull framework makes two important contributions to the existing 
debates on European studies.  
 
First, following a modified version of neo-Gramscian analysis, we frame the emergent 
illiberal wave as a counter-hegemonic bloc struggling over European political-
economic order. The argument, in a nutshell, can be articulated as follows: From a 
broader neo-Gramscian perspective, the EU project can be conceptualized as the 
consolidation of a liberal hegemonic bloc embedded in socio-economic structures in 
the form of free market economy and liberal democracy. It is a well-established fact 
that the liberal bloc played an important role in transforming the illiberal countries in 
much of the post-war period. In effect, “the continual advancement of political 
liberalism” (Pappas 2016, 23) embedded in free market economy has become 
defining aspect in the construction of the European order (van Apeldoorn 2002). The 
collapse of the alternative socio-economic models with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union institutionalized liberalism as an unrivalled ideological paradigm based on 
hegemonic reconfiguration of material power relations (see for instance, Fukuyama 
1992).  
 
The EU assumed an instrumental role in expanding liberal capitalism beyond Western 
Europe in the heyday of neoliberal globalization (Gill 2017). More recently, however, 
we experience a process of ‘reverse transformation’ in European integration, where 
the pendulum swings in the direction of illiberalism as a driving force across Europe.2 
We describe “illiberalism” as a broad-based ideology and worldview that embodies a 
spectrum of hybrid regimes ranging from electoral democracy to full authoritarianism. 
Accordingly, the right-wing populist parties and governments in the EU member 
states, in our classification, are illiberal in nature as they restrict political rights, civil 
liberties, and the rule of law. Hence, they intrinsically pose a challenge to liberal 
democracy and political pluralism upon which the EU has been built – especially 
given that they are more inclined to establish a transnational bloc in cooperation with 
                                                        
1 A different version of the push-and-pull framework is first sketched in Öniş and Kutlay (2019).   
2 In this paper, ‘reverse transformation’ refers to the rise of illiberal regimes within the EU and their 
increasing capacity to influence the liberal core values upon which the EU has been built. 
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authoritarian regimes outside the EU. 3  We therefore conceptualize the illiberal-
authoritarian movements that wield growing influence as an emergent counter-
hegemonic bloc undermining the very idea of liberal Europe. The neo-Gramscian 
reading of international political economy suggests, “the contradictions and conflicts 
that arise within any established structure create the opportunity for its transformation 
into a new structure” (Cox 1996, 146; also see Gramsci 1971, Cox 1983). The 
material contradictions of the liberal EU project in the form of multiple crises – which 
is called ‘push’ factors in our framework, opened new space for counter-hegemonic 
challengers not only as a form of passive resistance but also through material 
opportunities to re-structure the EU from within. As van Apeldoorn (2002, 20) 
suggests, “the stability and endurance of a hegemonic order can never be taken for 
granted.” Seen this way, the global financial crisis marked a watershed in terms of 
accelerating economic power shifts away from the West towards non-Western 
economies and attendant state-led development models. The rise of authoritarian great 
powers, either intentionally or unintentionally, empowers illiberal counter movements 
inside Europe through a series of incentives that provide new exit routes – which is 
called ‘pull’ factors in our framework. We therefore appear to be at a juncture where a 
new political-economic fault line emerges between the liberal hegemonic and 
illiberal-authoritarian counter-hegemonic blocs, the nature and properties of which 
can only be understood within the context of global political economy 
transformations. This does not necessarily mean the ultimate disintegration of the EU 
and it is soon to say what the long-run effects will be, but it heralds the emergence of 
a different kind of Europe, which is increasingly devoid of its core normative values 
in an era when democratic capitalism recedes. 
 
Second, the epistemological approach in this paper has its origins in multi-paradigm 
research to explore complex interactions among a set of distinct but interlinked 
developments in global political economy and European studies. As Sil and 
Katzenstein (2010a, 11) suggest mono-causal single paradigm research “runs the risk 
of a high degree of error […] to explain phenomena,” especially when it comes to 
                                                        
3 As such, they are analytically distinct from other authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China, 
which are becoming increasingly influential in Europe as part of the emergent illiberal-authoritarian 
bloc problematized in this paper. Based on Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) and V-Dem dataset, we 
categorize different countries according to their ‘autocratization’ scores. For illiberal EU member and 
candidate countries recently experienced significant autocratization, see table 1. 
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major transformations in times of multiple crises. This approach, which aims to 
explore mutual interactions among a set of causal mechanisms, proves particularly 
useful to address “complexity […] of particular real-world situations” instead of 
“more narrowly parsed research puzzles designed to test theories” (Sil and 
Katzenstein 2010b, 412). The challenges that the EU faces with and the possibility of 
a reverse transformation in European integration project as part of an emergent 
illiberal counter-hegemonic bloc requires complex causal stories, which can not be 
confined within the boundaries of paradigm-bound research. Stated differently, the 
causes of rising illiberalism in Europe cannot be traced to a single cause. To account 
for this complexity in a coherent and comprehensive way and contribute to the extant 
research, we develop an integrated perspective by explicitly problematizing the 
interplay of European and international dynamics in a shifting world order.         
    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We set the stage by examining the 
achievements of the EU with reference to the golden age of its transformative 
capacity (section 2). This is followed by an examination of the EU’s multiple crises 
involving economic, security and identity dimensions in a shifting international order 
(section 3). Section 4 develops a core element of the paper: We propose to go beyond 
the traditional confines of the North-South or East-West divide, which are often 
proposed as the basic fault-lines in contemporary Europe. We suggest an emergent 
political fault line between liberal and illiberal blocs, which provides a more 
compelling analytical toolkit to fathom the underlying causes of the EU’s reverse 
transformation. To this end, the proposed push-and-pull framework is utilized to 
address two key questions. First, how much power does the core states and EU 
institutions have in disciplining increasing illiberalism in member states such as 
Hungary and Poland (section 5). Second and more significantly, whether it is likely to 
observe a process of reverse transformation in European integration? Stated 
differently, can the newly emerging illiberal wave shape the future of European 
integration in reverse (section 6)? Finally, section 7 considers the possibility of a 
revitalized liberal democratic core – given our central position that the EU, with its 





The Golden Age of the EU’s Transformative Capacity 
 
Any serious analysis of the current predicaments of the EU ought to start from the 
premise that the European project has achieved considerable success. The dual 
processes of deep integration and enlargement have helped to bring about peace and 
prosperity to a continent, which had historically been characterized by massive 
political upheavals, notably with the rise of extreme nationalism that lead to two 
catastrophic world wars with tragic human sufferings (Jones and Menon 2019). The 
process of integration appeared to set in motion a virtuous cycle of democratization, 
economic expansion and free mobility with “14 million EU citizens resident in 
another Member State on a stable basis” (European Commission 2014a, 1). The 
economic size of the EU, being the biggest single market in the world, represents 
almost 23 percent of the global economic output.4  
 
Whilst core states that embarked on the European integration project undoubtedly 
benefited from more Europe, perhaps the two peripheries of the EU – i.e., Southern 
and Eastern Europe, also emerged as the main winners through three major waves. 
Consider the case of Ireland, which was the first ‘southern’ member of the then 
European Economic Community (in the sense of having a per capita GDP much lower 
than the core northern states). Ireland has become a magnet for transnational 
investment flows. The Irish experience, often referred to as the “Celtic tiger”, has 
been synonymous with one of the well-known success stories in the contemporary era 
(Dorgan 2005, also see Figure 1). The second major wave came with the southern 
enlargement process of the EU, involving the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal 
in 1980s. The Mediterranean trio was able to shed off their authoritarian legacies by 
managing to break away from dictatorships and consolidating liberal democratic 
regimes under the umbrella of the European integration (Gibson 2001; Royo and 
Manuel 2003). As figure 1 shows, all three, at varying degrees, benefited from 
expansion of trade, foreign investment and structural funds – as reflected in 




                                                        
4 Data retrieved from the IMF database.  
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Figure 1. GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$, selected European states vs. world average) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
A similar pattern occurred, finally, in the case of the CEE. East Germany, relieved 
from vagaries of communism, was integrated with Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) following a relatively long but mostly successful re-unification 
process. The states like Poland and Hungary have benefited from the EU integration, 
as these countries were able to leave behind their authoritarian legacies thanks to the 
domestic pro-reform coalitions that were empowered by the EU anchor. The literature 
suggests that substantive, if not unreserved and even, democratization took place in 
CEE over a relatively short span of time (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). 
Furthermore, these countries made significant gains in terms of trade, foreign 
investments, and access to structural and cohesion funds – particularly in the case of 
Poland that receives 22 percent of total cohesion funds,5 as well as capitalizing on free 
movement of labor within the single market. The European Commission research 
(van Ark et al 2013) documents that CEE countries extensively benefitted from 
foreign direct investments (FDI) flowing from the core Western states. Not as 
impressive as the CEE cases, Turkey, a candidate country since 1999, also 
experienced a significant interval of political-economic liberalization, clearly 
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facilitated by the anchoring role of the EU. In the Turkish case, the prospects of full-
membership has rapidly waned for a variety of domestic and external factors, which, 
in turn had far-reaching consequences in terms of the country’s recent illiberal turn 
(Table 1) – involving a massive shift away from democratic reform activism  (Öniş 
2016; Muftuler-Bac 2019; Demirtas 2015).  
 
In retrospect, the climax of the European integration process seems to be reached in 
early 2000s. The European project as a liberal hegemonic bloc appeared to be in solid 
shape in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The subsequent 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1998) constituted the hallmarks 
of an increasingly united European bloc, where deepening and widening proceeded at 
full speed. The 1990s were crucial in two important respects that cemented the EU’s 
transformative capacity in its sphere of interest: First, decisive steps were taken to 
complete the most aspiring integration step in Europe, namely transition to a single 
currency. Second, the most ambitious enlargement process to date was accomplished 
with a record number of 12 new states admitted as full-members in 2004 and 2007 as 
part of the ‘big bang enlargement.’ As the new millennium unfolded most of the 
European elites and pundits were confident that the EU could uphold the liberal 
international order and “run the 21st century” (Leonard 2005).  
 
 
The EU’s Multiple Crises: Economy-Security-Identity Challenges  
 
In early 2000s few could have imagined the kind of downturn that the EU would 
experience within the course of the next decades. The liberal EU project experienced 
a series of crises, which have raised serious questions about its founding principles – 
pluralist democracy and free market economy – as well as its transformative capacity. 
The recent developments in the EU brought about an unexpected and qualitatively 
different process of autocratization in several member and candidate countries. As 
Lührmann and Lindberg (2019, 1097) point out “contemporary autocrats have 
mastered the art of subverting electoral standards without breaking their façade 
completely.” Waldner and Lust (2018), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2019) and Coppedge 
(2017) similarly demonstrate that recent illiberal turn in global politics, including the 
EU, takes the form of gradual democratic erosion rather than sharp institutional 
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breakdowns. Elected executives weaken checks and balance mechanisms in a gradual 
and subtle way that impede the capacity of opposition forces to control ruling elites – 
a process Bermeo (2016) defines as “executive aggrandizement.” The V-Dem dataset, 
which measures recent democratic retreat in a more nuanced manner, shows that 
significant democratic reversal – i.e., “autocratization” – is evident in several member 
and candidate countries at the national and institutional level (Lührmann and 
Lindberg 2019, 1098-1101, Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Autocratization data on EU member and candidate states 
Country Begin End EDI before EDI end Type of Autocratization 
Poland 2013 2017 0.91 0.73 Democratic Erosion 
Serbia 2006 2017 0.69 0.45 Democratic Erosion 
Spain 2013 2017 0.88 0.77 Democratic Erosion 
Turkey 2008 2017 0.67 0.34 Democratic Erosion 
Croatia 2013 2017 0.85 0.67 Democratic Erosion 
Hungary 2010 2017 0.82 0.63 Democratic Erosion 
Notes: The Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) ranges from 0 (not democratic) to 1 (fully democratic). 
‘Begin’ denotes the year autocratization starts; ‘end’ denotes final available data. ‘EDI before’ 
denotes the electoral democracy score before autocratization takes place. ‘EDI end’ denotes the score 
of the country in the final year data available. This table is compiled from the online appendix of 
Lührmann and Lindberg (2019).  
 
Illiberal counter-movements and parties in other European states, such as Germany, 
Austria, France, and Italy, have also made significant electoral gains despite liberal 
norms and institutions still remain relatively robust (as we shall discuss below). 
According to Timbro (2019) report, 26.8 percent of voters support “an authoritarian 
populist party last time they voted in a national election” (Table 2). It is true that 
measuring anti-liberal tendencies prove challenging and different scholars question 
whether the rise of those parties pose an “intrinsic danger to democracy” (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser 2017, 79). Nevertheless, we maintain that “authoritarian turn in the past 
crisis decade” (Kreuder-Sonnen 2018) in European electoral landscape pose an 
intrinsic threat to liberal democracy and rule of law upon which the EU project has 









Table 2. Major illiberal parties in Europe and their vote shares 
Country Party Result (%) Last election 
Hungary FIDESZ 49.3 2018 
Poland PiS 44 2019 
Italy M5S 32.7 2018 
Switzerland SVP 29.4 2015 
Austria FPÖ 27.4 2017 
Slovenia SDS 24.9 2018 
Denmark DF 21.1 2015 
Hungary JOBBIK 21.1 2018 
Finland PS 17.6 2015 
Sweden SD 18.5 2017 
Italy LN 17.4 2018 
Norway FrP 15.7 2017 
Latvia KPV LV 15.8 2018 
France FN 13.2 2017 
Netherlands PVV 13 2017 
Germany AfD 12.6 2017 
Latvia NA 11 2018 
Czechia  SPD 10.6 2017 
Source: Timbro, https://populismindex.com/report/  
 
 
This brings about two major puzzles this paper aims to address: What explains the 
current tide of dramatic shifts in European integration project? How can we make 
sense of the complex developments that appear to trigger a process of reverse 
transformation in Europe – the swings of pendulum in the direction of an emergent 
illiberal bloc? To answer these questions, this section sketches push-and-pull 
framework that accounts for domestic and global political economy drivers of the 
reverse transformation set in motion in Europe (Graph 1).  
 
The ‘push’ factors concern gradual accumulation of internal crises of the liberal 
integration project that undermined pluralist democracy and free market economy as 
the backbones of the EU governance model. As the former president of the European 
Commission, Juncker (2016) suggested, “the polycrisis” of the EU “have not only 
arrived at the same time. They also feed each other, creating a sense of doubt and 
uncertainty in the minds of our [European] people.” The EU’s multiple crises, which 
brought about significant socio-economic restructuration, can be analyzed in four 
distinct but interrelated set of developments: (a) the impact of 9/11 attacks (b) the 
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European constitutional stalemate (c) the Eurozone crisis and (d) the migration 
turmoil. These four crises have posed intertwined challenges along security-economy-
identity nexus that cumulatively deepened the contradictions of the hegemonic 
governance practices in the EU and, therefore, led to ‘push’ side of the equilibrium 
for countries located in the broader periphery of Europe.  
 
To start with, the terrorist attacks associated with September 11, 2001, in retrospect, 
had long-lasting ramifications, which were arguably hard to anticipate at the time. 
Although the initial attacks targeted the U.S. they had a momentous impact on the 
whole of the Western psyche by unsettling the emergent post-materialist consensus on 
a cosmopolitan vision of Europe. Moreover, the terrorist attacks associated with 
radical Islamic groups were not confined to the U.S. They carried over into the 
European soil with a series of shocking incidents in key capitals including Madrid 
(2004), London (2005), Paris (2015, 2017, and 2018), and Brussels (2016). The 
impact of these external shocks was ultimately twofold. First, they helped to generate 
a growing sense of ontological anxiety in a continent, which appeared to be an extra-
ordinarily safe haven and a fortress of stability throughout the post-1945 period. 
Second, these events helped to produce a backlash against the vision of multicultural 
Europe, which has reached its peak with the dominance of center-left social 
democratic parties in key EU states during the late 1990s (Gerhard Schröder and SPD 
in Germany, Tony Blair and New Labour in Britain, Lionel Jospin and Socialists in 
France). From the early 2000s onwards we observe a gradual but profound right turn 
in European politics, which could partly be described as an underlying reaction to the 
crisis of multiculturalism in Europe (Laitin 2010).  
 
The second major challenge was a predominantly identity crisis associated with the 
constitutional stalemate. At the turn of the century, the European elites were confident 
that they could push ahead with the ultimate vision of a federal Europe. As the EU 
transitioned to a single currency the Constitution was considered as the inevitable 
next step, labeled as “the capstone of a European Federal State” by one of its authors 
(Verhofstadt 2004). Yet the initiative met with unanticipated resistance from the 
citizens at large, suggesting that the limits of a broad-based pan-European identity had 
already been tested by the early years of the 21st century (Hobolt and Brouard 2011; 
Gill 2017). The rejection of the constitutional proposal in the French and Dutch 
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referenda highlighted the fact that the idea of closer integration was not popular even 
in some core countries known with their deep commitment to the EU project. The 
reactions of citizens at large and growing skepticism to the delegation of more power 
to supranational EU institutions meant that the initial constitutional proposal needed 
to be shelved (Whitman, 2005). The constitutional crisis, as such, signaled one of the 
growing reactions against the liberal hegemonic bloc, namely the disjuncture between 
the views of the citizens and those of ruling elite that underscored the end of 
“permissive consensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009) – a fault-line that has been 
effectively capitalized by nationalist and mono-culturalist parties since then.  
 
The third major crisis that has thrown Europe into turmoil was in the economic realm. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 erupted with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers 
in the U.S., precipitously spread into Europe. As a matter of fact, the EU was proved 
much more exposed to the vagaries of financial crisis than the U.S. Although some 
countries managed to weather the storm (such as Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Austria) the Eurozone as a whole experienced deep calamity exacerbated with the 
inefficient management of the crisis. The prolonged stagnation, rising unemployment 
and growing inequality, as a result, alienated the peripheral states in the EU 
(Copelovitch, Frieden and Walter 2016). Given that the attractiveness of the liberal 
integration project was based on its ability to combine economic development with a 
commitment to democratic institutions and norms, the techno-managerial austerity 
policies implemented in the aftermath of the crisis fundamentally undermined the 
allure of the predominant socio-economic paradigm (Bruff 2014). On top of that, the 
migration crisis, which broke out in post-2014, set the final shock wave. The Arab 
upheavals, after a promising start in 2011, have reversed course and ended – at least 
for the moment – with grave failure and disappointment. The Syrian civil war, the 
bloodiest episode of the Arab upheavals, resulted in a massive exodus of migrants, 
possessing profound implications for the future of Europe. It posed fundamental 
economic, security and identity challenges by adding a new layer to the EU’s already 
complex multiple crises.6    
                                                        
6 Arguably, the Brexit decision, the single most important blow to the integration process in recent 
years, was a direct product of the anti-immigrant sentiment. 
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Graph 1. Push-and-pull dynamics of the EU’s declining transformative capacity 
Source: Authors’ own model 
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The internal crises of the liberal hegemonic bloc further challenged with the 
emergence of new material incentives due to power shifts in global political economy, 
which we call pull dynamics – i.e., growing impact of alternative models of 
capitalism. In effect, the rise of alternative models to democratic capitalism can only 
be understood once the Eurozone crisis is placed into its proper context. The 
Eurozone turmoil fundamentally impaired the viability of the common currency 
project, as the incompatibility of different varieties of capitalism in the monetary 
union raised severe concerns regarding the feasibility of the single currency 
experiment in a regional setting, where member countries vary widely in terms of 
development phases and domestic institutional arrangements (Hall 2012; Johnston 
and Regan 2018).  
 
The EU’s turmoil was part of a deeper and more structural transformation in the 
global political economy with major redistributive consequences. The global financial 
crisis marked a watershed in terms of the material power shifts away from the West 
towards non-Western economies (Acharya 2018; Layne 2018; Ikenberry 2018). This 
was a structural transformation already underway from the 1990s onwards. There is 
no doubt, however, that the global financial crisis and the Eurozone turmoil 
accelerated this process in a dramatic fashion. Among the non-Western powers, the 
most striking challenge came from Russia-China axis as more astute powers with 
their authoritarian brands of state capitalism and demonstrative effects on other 
countries. Hall and Ambrosio (2017, 144, 150) aptly point that it is difficult to 
systematically prove authoritarian promotion due to the “lack of transparency.” The 
recent literature, however, suggest that it exists, despite mechanisms, procedures, and 
impact remains a matter of controversy (Ambrosio 2010; Lankina, Libman and 
Obydenkova 2016; Bader, Gravingholt and Kastner 2010). Krastev and Holmes 
(2018, 118) argue that recent illiberal backlash in some EU member states can be 
explained with reference to the inversion of the “imitation imperative” – that is, 
“importing liberal-democratic institutions, applying Western political and economic 
recipes, and publicly endorsing Western values” in “a moral hierarchy within a single 
liberal, Western system.” We determine three potential pathways, all reducing the 
cost of foregoing imitation imperative, through which Russia-China axis undergird 
the emergent illiberal bloc in Europe.  
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First, state capitalism, as an alternative developmental path in non-Western great 
powers, has re-emerged as a challenger to democratic capitalist EU governance 
model. In state capitalist economies, state is considered more than a regulator that 
kick-starts the economy in the wake of recessions (Bremmer 2010). As a market 
maker, state organizes domestic political economy as part of “long-term government 
policy and economic success” (Kurlantzick 2016, 11). The strategic investments in 
key industries that underpin the research and development base of national 
economies, the establishment of public-private partnerships that invest in mega 
infrastructure projects, and political control of independent institutions such as central 
banks are considered not only important properties of developmental policies but also 
integral aspect of national security (Rediker 2015, Bremmer 2010; Kurlantzick 2016). 
Furthermore, state capitalist models mainly rely on illiberal political governance 
practices. In an explicit challenge to conventional wisdom that establishes positive 
correlation between liberal democracy and economic development, in those regimes, 
the main emphasis in politics is put on majoritarianism and ‘order and stability’, 
rather than individual rights and freedoms (Kutlay 2019).  
 
The state capitalist models, the logic goes, with exclusive emphasis on rapid 
development and national sovereignty, consider executive aggrandizement and 
strongman regimes as the safest route to swift decision-making to ensure economic 
success (Monck and Foa 2018). In a world where democratic efficacy recedes, 
authoritarian models of capitalism associated with the Russia-China axis, pose a 
fundamental challenge to the liberal hegemonic bloc (Öniş and Kutlay 2019). China, 
in particular, with 8.3 percent annual growth in the post-crisis period has become a 
more influential actor, whereas the EU managed to grow 0.6 percent (Figure 3). On a 
broader scale, the countries rated “not free” (Freedom House’s lowest category) made 
up 12 per cent of global income in 1990. This ratio skyrocketed to 33 percent today, 
“matching the level they achieved in the early 1930s, during the rise of fascism in 
Europe, and surpassing the heights they reached in the Cold War when Soviet power 
was at its apex” (Mounk and Foa 2018, 30). Thus, non-Western challengers, whether 
intentionally or not, are more likely to exert growing influence through alternative 




Figure 3. Growth of real GDP (2009-2016, average % change) 
  
Source: UN World Economic Situation, 2018. 
 
Second, non-Western powers provide exit routes for states in the EU’s periphery, 
which reduces the cost of defecting from “imitation imperative,” through ample trade 
and investment opportunities (see section 6). The normative appeal of the liberal 
model, therefore, receives a major setback with the rise of unlikely rivals abroad. 
Third, authoritarian promotion may take place through active intervention in 
European political landscape by expanding political, communicational, and 
organizational linkages (Hall and Ambrosio 2017, 150). As discussed below, this is 
particularly the case when it comes to Russia’s growing impact on and promotion of 
illiberal political movements in European states, which “refer to Putin’s Russia as the 
model of an alternative political order opposing liberal democracy” (Shekhovtsov 
2017, xxvii; also see Orenstein 2014; Cameron and Orenstein 2012).  
 
 
Beyond the North-South and East-West Divide: Liberal vs. Illiberal Blocs 
 
The EU’s overlapping multiple crises, unfolding within the context of push-and-pull 
dynamics, have exposed two fundamental fault-lines, which have been amplified over 
time: (a) The North-South divide and (b) the East-West divide. More pressing than 
these already existing cleavages, this paper argues, a third political fault-line appears 
to be in the making, which is more likely to inform an increasingly fragmented 























The North-South divide is fundamentally economic, which historically remains a 
major cleavage despite Southern European countries have benefited from the 
European transformation process. The crisis tendencies accumulated due to the 
significant divergence of political economy structures of the Northern and Southern 
economies. Whereas the Northern members of the Eurozone are well positioned 
thanks to their competitive capacity and strong export-led growth models, the 
Southern members gradually lost their competitive edge and relied on public and 
private overspending (Hall 2012, 359). Given that currency devaluation ceased to be 
an option for these states to restore competitiveness with the adoption of euro, 
accumulating balance of payments deficits are financed through massive capital flows 
– in the form of cheap credits – from the northern economies, which abruptly stopped 
with the Eurozone turmoil (Simonazzi, Ginzburg and Nocella 2013).  
 
The most dramatic impact has occurred in the Greek case, though the crisis also hit 
other Southern members. Italy in particular, a country often considered in the 
traditional European core, has emerged as one of the most problematic cases, with the 
scale of its debt problem and its inability to comply with the Eurozone disciplines, 
which along with migration crisis, has generated a sharp turn in the direction of 
political illiberalism at the domestic realm. One of the paradoxes of European 
integration is that in the past the periphery has been the major winner, but in post-
crisis, the pattern has been reversed and the Southern periphery has emerged as a 
major loser at a time when the advanced Northern states managed to remain more 
resilient – as strikingly exemplified with the growing economic power of Germany as 













Figure 4. GDP per capita (purchasing power parity, Germany=100) 
 
Source: IMF, world economic outlook database 
 
 
Turning to the East-West divide the strong illiberal turn in CEE observed in recent 
years, with striking examples from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski’s Poland, suggest that there is a more fundamental problem at stake. For 
the future of liberal hegemonic bloc in Europe, the East-West divide appears to be by 
far the more fundamental fault-line. The problem in CEE appears to be a deeper 
political misfit, as opposed to a narrow-based economic division (Krastev and Holmes 
2018). Hence, simply relying on economic recovery will not help to overcome the 
illiberal drift in those polities. The Polish case is quite telling in this respect. Poland 
has managed to maintain robust economic growth and has largely evaded the negative 
consequences of the Eurozone crisis (Figure 4), yet experienced a significant 
democratic backsliding in recent years, constituting an outright challenge to the EU’s 
core normative principles (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016; Börzel and Langbein 2019, 
955-956). 
 
Whilst the North-South and East-West divides are valuable typologies in terms of 
understanding the persistence of socio-economic cleavage structures (Börzel and 
Langbein 2019; Rhodes, Epstein and Börzel 2019; Magone, Laffan and Schweiger 
2016), this paper suggests that a more refined understanding could be provided with 
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EU has been designed to “uphold a set of core values, including democracy, pluralism 
and the rule of law” (Treaty on European Union, Article 7), which installed liberal 
democracy as default setting, toward which member and candidate states are expected 
to converge. We argue, however, that in a shifting international order, for the first 
time in the history of European integration, a group of illiberal insiders, in tacit 
cooperation with a group of outsiders, appear to be challenging the liberal hegemonic 
bloc upon which the EU has been built. This paper conceptualizes this emerging trend 
as a possible ‘reverse transformation’ in European integration, not because it 
necessarily poses an ontological threat to the liberal EU project but mainly because it 
is unique and likely to stay with us as a new cleavage structure in foreseeable future 
due to the complex dynamics sketched in the push-and-pull framework.    
 
What would be the key ingredients of this broader notion of emergent counter-
hegemonic bloc in the EU? We particularly identify three layers, which interact with 
and reinforce each other – even though, perhaps, sporadic and inchoate for the time 
being. First, a major constituency would be ‘peripheral insiders’ – i.e., illiberal 
governments in new members and candidate countries. Whilst these states follow the 
rules of electoral democracy, they, at the same time, significantly deviate from the 
norms of liberal democracy in terms of respect for minority rights, media freedoms 
and judicial autonomy (Kelemen 2017; Sedelmeier 2014). In Poland, Law and Justice 
(PiS) secured a strong win in the 2015 and 2019 elections, becoming the first outright 
majority government in post-communist era. The party has been accused of an 
illiberal turn, failing to respect the Polish Constitution, separation of powers and 
undermining democracy in its approach to the judiciary, media, public appointments 
and civil rights (Przybylski 2018; Kelemen 2017; Rech 2018). A more dramatic 
version of the Polish experience can be observed in the case of Hungary, where an 
equally strong conservative and ethno-nationalist party, FIDESZ, has dominated the 
political scene in recent years under the flamboyant leadership of Viktor Orbán 
(Kornai 2015). As a result, the European Commission (2017), in the context of Rule 
of Law Framework set up in 2014 (European Commission 2014b), activated Article 7 
against Poland, which opens a path to sanction a member state and temporary 
suspension of the EU Council voting rights in case core EU values are violated. Also, 
the European Parliament (2018) voted in favour of a motion against Hungary in 
September 2018 to determine whether Hungary breaches the core EU values, despite 
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the fact that the short-term dynamics of “European party politics” undermined 
effective EU action against Orban government (Kelemen 2017, 225-226; Rech 2018, 
336).  
 
Whilst Orbán/FIDESZ in Hungary and Kaczynski/PiS in Poland receive significant 
media attention in recent times, they are only one element of the emerging illiberal 
bloc in the European space. Far-right parties in core Western European states also 
have become increasingly influential as the second layer of emergent illiberal bloc. 
The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany and Le Pen’s National Front in 
France have become major challengers in the electoral contest (Lees 2018; The 
Economist 2015). Although they have not yet managed to win elections on an outright 
basis, they increasingly have powerful effect on the overall political discourse. The 
center-right parties, especially, find themselves under pressure to adopt some of the 
policies of far-right contenders so that the pendulum swings to illiberalism. The 
weight and influence of far-right parties in established Western European 
democracies have magnified as a result of the EU’s multiple crises. These parties are 
able to capture the imagination of ordinary citizens by capitalizing on the politics of 
fear in an environment where the exodus of foreigners is seen to present a threat not 
only in economic but also in cultural terms – which help them foster a pan-European 
countermovement trying to transform the EU from within (see next section).  
 
The third layer that nurtures emergent illiberal bloc appears as the key actors outside 
Europe, namely Russia, China, and arguably post-Trump-election America. The 
election of Donald Trump in November 2016 has fundamentally fragmented 
transatlantic alliance and diluted the hegemonic core in Europe. The American global 
role in the age of Trump, which Posen (2018) coins as the “rise of illiberal 
hegemony,” fragments the predominant liberal compromise. Russia and China have 
also emerged as major European actors in recent years. Russia is more assertive 
through its energy deals and interventionism in electoral politics of several European 
states, which has been documented by the European Commission (2019). China, 
however, with its more dynamic economy, pursues a subtler strategy and makes its 
presence felt through massive investments in the region (Kendall-Taylor and 
Shullman 2018). Several Eastern European countries are looking at Putin’s Russia 
and Jinping’s China as new economic and political partners – a point to be explored 
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below. Finally, the position of Turkey in this picture is quite interesting. Turkey is a 
country significantly transformed by the liberal European core, notably in the 1990s 
and the early 2000s. In recent years, however, the process seems to be reversed. 
Turkey under Erdoğan increasingly finds itself aligned with the Russia-China axis. In 
analytical terms, it is becoming a member of the broader illiberal bloc – a candidate 
country, with weak credentials for membership, acting in co-operation with other key 
actors constituting the counter-hegemonic coalition against liberal core. 
 
The Limits of the Liberal Core’s Transformative Capacity over Periphery  
 
The recent dramatic chain of events in Poland and Hungary raise broader questions 
about the capacity of the EU to discipline member states for their failure to preserve 
the EU values. At first sight, it would appear that the liberal core in Europe would 
have much greater leverage over ‘illiberal insiders’ (countries, which are already 
inside the EU and benefit in a multitude of ways from the benefits of the membership 
process) compared to ‘illiberal outsiders.’ Indeed, as discussed above, there have been 
recent clashes between the EU and Poland over controversial judicial reforms. The 
European Commission has launched Rule of Law Framework under Article 7, 
threatening the Polish government with sanctions including possible suspension of the 
country’s voting rights in the European Council (European Commission 2017). 
Recent clashes have also occurred in the context of the EU’s intent to link budget to 
the rule of law, which, could, in principle, be a powerful incentive to comply with the 
EU norms (Strzelecki and Strauss 2018). A similar process could be identified in the 
case of Hungary, where the FIDESZ government has come under serious criticism 
from the EU institutions. The President of the European Council at the time, Donald 
Tusk, for instance, publicly criticized Orban by stating, “no one has the right, at least 
in our political family, to attack liberal democracy and its foundations” (Stone 2018). 
 
Whilst the liberal core have acted to curb illiberal trends in the key CEE countries, its 
ability to translate the threat mechanisms into effective action is seriously constrained 
by intervention paradox. On the one hand, countries like Hungary and Poland act in 
coalition and take advantage of the voting procedures to veto effective action on part 
of the EU, which necessitates unanimity at the EU Council to trigger Article 7, even if 
the majority of member states feel that such disciplines are desirable (Rech 2018). 
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Hungary has emerged as a key ally in Poland’s clash with the EU, forming a hardline 
axis against EU’s interference in constitutional issues. Orbán, for instance, lambasted, 
“when they attack Poland from Brussels, they are attacking the whole of central 
Europe” (Hopkins 2019). On the other hand, the EU institutions face the delicate 
situation that such disciplines and sanctions could be seen as interference in the 
sovereign political space of member states. This, in turn, triggers a powerful 
nationalist backlash, helping to bolster the stronghold of nativist parties and leaders. 
Indeed Orbán uses this line of rhetoric very effectively to strengthen his position in 
domestic politics and carves the political space to push Hungary into a profoundly 
illiberal direction.  
 
In a post-liberal international order where the efficacy of liberal governance model is 
in decline, one could argue that the ability of the EU to discipline Hungary and 
Poland prove increasingly more limited. The right-wing populist leaders effectively 
make use of the rhetoric of internal/external ‘enemies’ and tie outside interference to 
this kind of rhetoric to create “a feeling of siege” (Reich 2018, 339). Consequently, 
and rather strikingly, there was little that the EU could do to prevent a leading higher 
education institution in the region, the Central European University, associated with 
the liberal-oriented Soros Foundation, from being pushed out of Budapest. Therefore, 
based on a multitude of evidence, Hungary is increasingly identified as an exemplary 
case of the collapse of liberal democracy in the heartland of Europe (Kelemen 2017; 
Sedelmeier 2014; Way and Levitsky 2019). 
 
The EU’s intervention paradox has become even more delicate in the post-Brexit 
process. The possibility of the domino effect triggered by Brexit constrains the 
effectiveness of counter policy instruments for the core actors, resulting in further 
fragmentation. Thus, the EU sits on the sharp edge of the knife as imminent fear of 
over-reaction prevails: pushing too hard with the EU disciplines would not only 
strengthen the hand of ultra-nationalist leaders, but they could go even further and 
precipitate exit strategies on part of these countries. Being too lenient, however, 
would mean that powerful leaders riding the nationalist-populist wave and their 
governments enjoying strong electoral support find almost unlimited political space to 
translate their authoritarian inclinations into practice without leaving the EU (Reich 
2018, 339). Hence, the hegemonic bloc trying to confront the illiberal challenge has 
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been encountered with a fundamental paradox, where over-reaction and under-
reaction could equally prove to be ineffective, and even, self-destructive in dealing 
with the sources of the problem.  
 
The Possibility of Reverse Transformation  
 
The emergent illiberal bloc is, in fact, much broader than the narrow alliance of the 
key CEE countries. The broader periphery may have the power and influence over the 
liberal core, to institute a process of reverse transformation, which would involve not 
necessarily disintegration of the EU, but a pronounced weakening of its normative 
credentials. The first critical point to emphasize is that leaders like Kaczyński and 
Orbán are not necessarily interested in copying the Brexit strategy. Indeed, Orbán is 
clear on this issue. What he wants to achieve is to be an integral part of a process 
whereby the EU is transformed from within and evolved into a different kind of entity 
(Dewan, McLaughlin and Mortensen 2018, also see above). The EU that Orbán 
envisages is mono-cultural and anti-immigrant with closed borders constituted by 
“patriots instead of cosmopolitans […] Christian culture instead of a multicultural 
mishmash” (Hungary Today 2019). It is a vision of Europe where the majorities have 
the upper hand, with minimal respect for political rights and civil liberties. At the 
same time, it is a vision, where economic and security interests dominate over 
democratic rights and individual freedoms.  
 
Orbán’s vision from within, appears to be broadly compatible with, and influenced 
by, the visions of key illiberal-authoritarian outsiders such as Russia, China and even 
Turkey. As sketched in push-and-pull framework, key external actors not only serve 
as a role model for the leaders of illiberal European states but they also share a similar 
vision of the EU, which would continue to be a strong partner in economic and 
security realms, but sheds off its concerns with issues of democratization and human 
rights, which would necessarily infringe on the sovereign space of individual nations. 
As such, authoritarian promotion of Russia and China have been increasingly 
influential in the European space to such an extent that these two major powers could 
now be considered, in part, as notable European actors.  
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Russian presence is perhaps more visible, given the geopolitical importance of Russia 
for an energy dependent Europe. The literature suggest that Russia has become an 
assertive actor in terms of containing democracy promotion and promoting illiberal 
governance model in its immediate neighborhood (Ambrosio 2009; Babayan 2015; 
Tolstrup 2013). Recently, Russia, in spite of the rhetoric of sovereignty, has actively 
intervened in the internal political and electoral affairs of several Western 
democracies (The Economist 2017; Kendall-Taylor 2019). For instance, the pro-
Russian websites are reported to support the official campaign site of the Italy’s far-
right Matteo Salvini. Germany’s AfD also gets “strong support from both official 
Russian government media and unofficial pro-Russia channels” (Apuzzo and Satarino 
2019). The European Commission (2019, 3) describes the Russian interference as “a 
hybrid threat” to the EU and its core values:  
 
A continued and sustained disinformation activity by Russian sources aiming 
to suppress turnout and influence voter preferences [in Europe]. These covered 
a broad range of topics, ranging from challenging the Union’s democratic 
legitimacy to exploiting divisive public debates on issues such as of migration 
and sovereignty [which] pose a hybrid threat to the EU. 
  
 
Chinese efforts have so far been subtler and “less flashy than those of Moscow” 
(Benner et al 2018, 5-6), but, with “seemingly bottomless wallet in hand,” 
increasingly making its presence felt in wider Europe through its trade and investment 
activities. According to Bloomberg data, “China has bought or invested in assets 
amounting to at least $318 billion over the past 10 years [in Europe] – 45 percent 
more China-related activity than the U.S” (Tartar, Rojanasakul and Diamond 2018). 
China also launched 16+1 forum for meetings with 16 CEE/Western Balkan states 
and offered US$10 billion special credit line (Garlick 2019, 1390-1391). As stated in 
the previous section, Chinese economic incentives are likely to jeopardize (1) the 
allure of democratic capitalism by juxtaposing its state capitalist model as an 
alternative and (2) reduce the cost of inverting “imitation imperative” via material 
resources and exit routes for European states, especially in an austere post-crisis 
economic environment. The material incentives, for sure, are utilized in return for 
political support to Beijing. For instance, in March 2017, Hungary, one of the major 
beneficiaries of Chinese capital, “derailed the EU’s consensus by refusing to sign a 
joint letter denouncing the reported torture of detained lawyers in China” (Benner et 
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al 2018, 16). Czech Republic is another striking example, which used to be quite 
critical of the human rights records of China. After leadership change in 2014, critical 
voices have been sidelined and the new president strove to cultivate close ties with 
China that resulted in a strategic partnership agreement with a prospect of large 
volume of Chinese investments (Benner et al 2018, 17). The Czech President even 
argued that his country’s sour relations with China were due to the “submissive 
attitude of the previous government towards USA and the EU” (quoted in Benner et al 
2018, 17).  
 
The CEE and the Western Balkans form a contestation ground between the core EU 
states and institutions on the one hand, and the Russia-China axis on the other 
(Kendall-Taylor 2019). For countries like Hungary and Poland, which are on a 
distinct illiberal path, Russia-China axis not only offers alternative models of 
capitalism, but also economic resources and opportunities, which render them 
economically more viable and, hence, in a stronger bargaining position with the EU’s 
liberal core. It is striking that Orbán looks at Russia and China as his model cases of 
successful development (Mahony 2014). In one of his speeches, Orbán (2014) 
declared “I don’t think that our EU membership precludes us from building an 
illiberal new state based on national foundations.” He even pointed out Russia, China, 
and Turkey as role models, “none of which is liberal and some of which aren’t even 
democracies” (Orbán 2014). The Hungarian prime minister, in line with the spirit of 
the counter hegemonic inclinations in those states, has implemented a set of heterodox 
nationalist economic policies most clearly exemplified in the case of interference with 
Central Bank independence (Johnson and Barnes 2015: 14-15). 
 
Whilst perhaps not as important on the scale of the global powers such as Russia and 
China, Turkey’s positioning in the process of reverse transformation, as an 
increasingly outsider actor in Europe, is also quite interesting. Erdoğan’s approach is 
a striking example of how outside actors try to establish a new type of relationship 
with the EU. Turkey’s relations with the EU is increasingly based on narrow, interest-
based transactional co-operation on a number of key issues such as expansion of trade 
and investment links, energy, and the management of migration flows (Öniş and 
Kutlay 2019). Turkish political elite has no intention of pulling out of the Customs 
Union established in the mid-1990s, even though there are frequent talks about 
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improving the terms of the agreement itself. Turkey, in recent years, has also been 
trying to forge alliances with like-minded actors in Europe as well as positioning itself 
in the Russia-China axis.  
 
The second critical point is that the rising illiberal wave does not only influence the 
normative orientation in states located in the periphery of Europe, but also leads to the 
emergence of new peripheries within core EU states, which in turn strengthens the 
broader notion of illiberal bloc as sketched in this paper. For instance, in France, 
Marine Le Pen’s National Front has been a strong contender in national elections. 
Recent political shifts in Italy, and the growing popularity of the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini as the representative of the Northern 
League in the unlikely coalition with the left leaning Five Star Movement, are quite 
striking in this respect: A key politician in one of the core European states is adopting 
the language of illiberal politics, and establishing pan-European alliance with other 
like minded political elites. Salvini already established partnership with Hungary’s 
Orbán and Poland’s Kaczyński to “take over the EU” and “transform European 
politics” from within (Walker 2019).  
 
The illiberal movements, whilst perhaps not the dominant political force, forge new 
alliances – even if loosely coupled, including key countries like Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden (Baume 2019). On that note, as discussed above, the 
election of Trump in 2016 not only fragmented the transatlantic alliance but also 
constituted a big blow to the fortunes of the liberal core in Europe. Indeed, many 
Eastern European leaders look towards Trump in the same way that they look at 
Putin. The role Trump played in the Polish case, for example, is quite striking. There 
seems to be a fundamental difference between Poland and Hungary that the former is 
strongly Russia skeptic whereas the latter is not. However, the distance from Russia is 
compensated by the growing importance of the Chinese investments in economic 
terms. Also, the U.S. under the leadership of Trump continues its role an important 
European actor, but in an essentially negative sense by undermining the core liberal 
values of the EU. Ironically, the U.S., which historically has been one of the key 
architects of the hegemonic bloc throughout the post-War period, as now placed in the 
opposing camp of the emergent illiberal bloc challenging the liberal core in the 
broader European political space. 
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The illiberal moment in global political economy strengthens the positions of the 
counter movements in our scenario, which reinforce each other’s existence and 
support. The illiberal wave is a global phenomenon and given the strength of the 
interactions, linkages and the depth of coalition building efforts of authoritarian 
leaders, their combined presence is likely to constitute a fundamental challenge to the 
core liberal values of the EU. The global nature of this coalition also suggests that its 
influence is unlikely to recede anytime soon that brings about reverse transformation 





The transformative power of the liberal core over the illiberal regimes has often been 
identified as one of the principal achievements of the post-War settlement in Europe. 
This trend, however, has arguably reached its climax with the institutionalization of 
the single currency experiment and the Eastern enlargement process. A series of 
interlocking crises have fundamentally shaken the economic and normative 
foundations of the hegemonic European project. This paper examined the socio-
economic dynamics of a possible reverse transformation in Europe by identifying 
three layers that interact with and reinforce each other. Central to our argument is to 
place disintegrative factors into global push-and-pull framework rather than studying 
the EU as a self-contained system. The strong illiberal elements in European states 
increasingly challenge the dominance of established parties, both on the center-right 
and center-left of the political spectrum. The family of heavily nationalist and illiberal 
leaders from Putin to Trump, from Orban to Erdoğan, from Le Pen to Salvini benefit 
from each other’s existence and indeed try to form alliances and cross-cutting 
coalitions to advance their cause rather than remaining on the receiving end of the 
hegemonic contest over prevalent norms in a shifting international order.  
 
Given the emergent pattern of reverse transformation, what are the prospects for a 
revitalized liberal core to overcome this powerful challenge in the coming years? The 
Merkel-Macron axis generated a renewed sense of confidence for a revitalization of 
the EU, based on a strong commitment to its normative foundations. The performance 
of the Green parties in the European parliamentary elections of 2019 constitutes an 
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additional cause for optimism that a progressive counter-wave is in motion. However, 
there were also growing fears about the strength and durability of this alliance, given 
that both Macron and Merkel faced major challenges in their respective political 
spheres. In Macron’s case, attempts to push with neoliberal economic reforms to 
revitalize the French economy were met with very strong societal resistance. As a 
result, a major discrepancy emerged between Macron’s international and domestic 
status. In the international sphere, he emerged as a key figure in the revitalization of 
the core European project. In the domestic sphere, his position appeared to be 
increasingly fragile and insecure, as large segments of the French society saw him as 
a direct representative of powerful business interests, a man who was more on the side 
of elites than ordinary people. In the German case, where the economic situation 
appeared to be far more favorable, the conflict emerged over migration. Merkel’s 
liberal approach to refugees was severely contested in domestic political realm. Anti-
immigrant sentiment not only precipitated the growing popularity and electoral 
support of the ultra-nationalist AfD, but also undermined her position within her own 
party, resulting in a change of leadership. 
 
We should not underestimate the strength of the liberal core in the EU, though. Its 
long-term durability is likely to depend on a number of interrelated factors. First, an 
inclusive economic recovery seems to be a major precondition. Almost a decade 
following the onset of the global financial crisis, the EU is now on the path to fragile 
recovery. Yet, the process proves to be extremely uneven. The recovery of growth per 
se will be insufficient, if large segments of society within the individual states fail to 
capitalize on the benefits of economic growth. A second major pre-condition seems to 
be a greater commitment on part of the center-right parties and governments to the 
principles of liberal democracy and a greater willingness to enter into coalition with 
other progressive elements such as social democrats, liberals, greens to forge broad-
based coalitions. The experience of the European People’s Party (EPP), a key 
coalition of center-right parties in the European Parliament has arguably done a poor 
job in protecting the EU’s liberal democratic values by not taking sufficiently 
vigorous action against illiberal leaders, as the case of Orban in Hungary aptly 
illustrates (Kelemen 2017, 224-227). There is also the danger that center-right parties 
may find themselves swinging the right to maintain electoral popularity in the face of 
a major populist challenge mounted from the far right. 
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This brings the role of civil society to fore as a potentially important element in the 
recovery of the transnational progressive-democratic coalition across Europe. There 
are already signs of this kind of societal, grassroots resistance. Massive anti-
government protests in Hungary and Poland constitute striking examples of this 
tendency, which will be important in terms of upholding liberal democratic 
foundations of the European integration project. The attractiveness of the EU, in an 
increasingly post-western international order, will depend on its ability to maintain its 
strong normative credentials and serve as a model for the rest of the world. The 
balance of evidence, however, so far suggests that the pendulum may be swinging in 
the direction of reverse transformation. Even if the rising tide does not mean the 
disintegration of the EU, this paper argued that it heralds the emergence of a 
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